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Abstract 
This  paper  proposes  that  the  underlying  cause  of  the  macroeconomic 
problems  facing  Pakistan  today  are  a  series  of  supply  shocks  which  have 
constrained output growth.  It  is argued  that while  the  current debate has  solely 
focused on government expenditures and revenues, it is critical to also address the 
acute energy shortages which is constraining supply. The paper goes on to present 
four  recommendations  for  breaking  out  of  the  present  stagflation:  (i)  prudent 
macroeconomic  management,  (ii)  reviving  the  role  of  the  government  in 
development while restoring fiscal balance, (iii) loosening monetary policy in order 
to spur the private sector, and (iv) improving social safety nets. 
Keywords: Economic Growth, Supply Shock, Pakistan. 
JEL Classification: F43, P44. 
1. Introduction 
As far back as the 1950s, Pakistan’s economic growth has been 
characterized by stop-go cycles. Periods of high economic growth, 
sparked in many cases by increases in foreign resource inflows, have been 
followed by a sharp slowdown as foreign resource inflows dried up, 
resulting in unsustainable current account and fiscal deficits that dictated 
deflationary measures. 
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Figure 1: Pakistan’s Macroeconomic Performance 
 
Source: Government of Pakistan. (n.d.). Pakistan Economic Survey (Various issues). Islamabad. 
As can be seen from Figure 1,1 Pakistan has over the last 30 years 
experienced periods of high economic growth with low inflation followed 
by low economic growth with low to moderate inflation (or variants of this 
combination). It is important to note here that spurts of high economic 
growth since 1980 have taken place when inflation levels were generally 
low. Starting in 2007/08, the economy has, over the last four years, 
witnessed a new phenomenon—very low economic growth with very high 
double-digit inflation, a situation classically described as stagflation. 
The main aim of this study is to identify the factors that are 
responsible for this continuing stagflation, and new policy measures 
needed to break out of this undesirable situation. The thrust of the 
analysis is on understanding the macroeconomic dynamics of this 
continuing stagflation, which could form the basis of the remedial 
measures being proposed. 
The fundamental proposition being put forward is that, while the 
underlying cause of this crisis still lies in the economy’s basic structural 
weaknesses and lack of political will to carry out much needed economic 
                                                 
1 The two bands shown in Figure 1 represent the lower side of minimum economic growth (4 
percent) that would ensure at least some increase in per capita income, given Pakistan’s population 
growth rate, which is estimated at just over 2 percent. (To avoid rising unemployment with a 
growth rate of 3 percent of the labour force would require a minimum growth of around 6 percent.) 
The upper band (8 percent) represents the average inflation rate for the entire period. Pakistan, with 
the exception of the recent past, has very seldom experienced double-digit inflation. 
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reforms, the major cause of this current stagflation is a series of supply 
shocks (acute energy shortages, rising global oil prices, and 
unprecedented floods in the summer of 2010). These supply shocks—
which have pushed the supply curve upward, seriously constraining 
output growth—when combined with rising demand pressures (high 
fiscal deficits financed by direct borrowings from the State Bank of 
Pakistan (SBP), large increases in remittances, high government-
supported cereal prices, and large increases in the wages of public sector 
employees) have unleashed high inflation. In these conditions, both 
unemployment and poverty levels must have risen.  
The article goes on to argue that, while the current and almost sole 
emphasis in the policy debate on raising revenues and curbing the fiscal 
deficit is well justified, this in itself will not be sufficient. Equally 
important is solving or easing the real binding constraint to the supply 
side of acute energy shortages, which are crippling the economy, 
especially manufacturing, services, and the informal economy. We then 
propose a four-point strategy to tackle the current crisis and move the 
economy out of stagflation.  
2. The Economic Context 
A growing body of opinion (see Ahmed, 2011; Haque, 2010) traces 
the roots of the current crisis to many of the economic policies adopted by 
the last Musharraf government. These included in 2002/03 (i) the 
adoption of a loose monetary policy to jumpstart the economy; (ii) the 
lack of any serious attempt to undertake basic structural reforms or raise 
the tax/gross domestic product (GDP) ratio; and (iii) a policy of “inaction 
and neglect” in anticipating the emerging large gap in supply of and 
demand for energy, and failing to raise energy prices when the first oil 
shock hit; these measures were politically expedient as it was an election 
year. While the government implemented some desirable economic 
policies that spurred growth, on the whole they were not sufficient.  
The Musharraf government appears to have been lulled into 
inaction, as previous governments had also been, by the massive 
increases in remittances and foreign inflows as well as the rescheduling of 
foreign debt and easier access to some (European Union) export markets 
for some time, following 9/11. Growth was also mainly consumption-led 
and energy-intensive as cheap credit was made available to buy 
consumer durables, especially automobiles. Investment levels did 
increase (domestic and foreign) but were clearly still low, hovering at 
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their peak at just over 20 percent of GDP, and were clearly insufficient to 
result in sustainable growth.  
The economy, therefore, remained delicately balanced and 
vulnerable during the Musharraf period. With the very first external 
shock in 2006/07—the unprecedented increase in global oil and cereal 
prices—the economy began to flounder. This downturn in economic 
growth, which started in 2006/07, had by March 2008—when the new 
government took office—ballooned into a full-fledged economic crisis. 
The fiscal deficit estimated for 2007/08 (in March 2008) was 9 percent, the 
current account deficit was 8 percent of GDP, and falling foreign 
exchange reserves were declining by almost USD1 billion each month at 
the peak of the increase in global oil prices. 
With foreign exchange reserves in early 2007 at only USD17 billion 
and fast declining, the new government had no choice but to opt for strong 
deflationary measures. When the government found that there were few 
“friends” who could bail it out, it had no recourse but to approach the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Indeed, even Pakistan’s “friends” 
encouraged the government to seek IMF support as many felt that only it 
could provide the “strong arm” needed to ensure that the government 
would implement stabilization measures together with much needed 
economic reforms, especially the imposition of value-added tax (VAT) 
(later called the reformed general sales tax [RGST]). There was clearly a 
“trust deficit” between the new government and major donor countries. 
That Pakistan suffered from weak macroeconomic fundamentals, 
which made it much more vulnerable, first, to the oil and commodity 
price shocks and then the financial crisis that followed, can be seen by 
comparing its performance to its neighbors in the South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) (Amjad & Din, 2010). 
Pakistan fared far worse from the global financial crisis than India, 
Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka, and these countries also rebounded quickly to 
return to their earlier high growth path while Pakistan remained mired in 
stagflation (see Table 1). 
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Table 1: Macroeconomic Policies and Growth Reforms 
South Asia: Impact of the Financial Crisis 
GDP Growth Rates (%) 
Country FY 
2004 
FY 
2005 
FY 
2006 
FY 
2007 
FY 
2008 
FY 
2009 
FY 
2010 
FY 
2011 
Bangladesh 6.3 6.0 6.6 6.4 6.2 5.9 5.5 6.0 
India 8.5 7.5 9.5 9.6 9.3 6.8 8.0 8.6 
Pakistan 7.5 9.0 5.8 6.8 3.7 1.7 3.8 2.4 
Sri Lanka 5.4 6.2 7.7 6.8 6.0 3.5 8.0 8.0 
FY = fiscal year, GDP = gross domestic product. 
Sources: Bangladesh Economic Review, 2011; Economic Survey of India, 2009; Economic 
Survey of Pakistan, 2011; Economic Survey of Sri Lanka, 2009; Economic and 
Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific, 2011.  
In all fairness it should be said that Pakistan has suffered, especially 
in the last three years, due to a fragile security situation and low-level 
insurgency resulting in considerable loss of both domestic and foreign 
business confidence. Also, the unprecedented floods in the summer of 2010 
estimated at costing USD10 billion by a joint World Bank/Asian 
Development Bank study shaved off nearly 1 to 1.5 percent of expected 
growth, besides destroying badly required physical infrastructure. 
Yet, as we shall argue, this difficult and challenging situation has 
been made worse by poor macroeconomic management and a serious 
lack of coordination in economic policymaking, especially by fiscal and 
monetary policy authorities. 
3. Supply Shocks and Stagflation2 
How a supply shock flowing from, say, an increase in oil prices or 
severe power shortages can result in stagflation is illustrated by the 
simple diagram below. 
 
 
                                                 
2 There is a large body of literature on stagflation. During the 1960s and 1970s, stagflation in Latin 
American economies, with their peculiar characteristics (wide income and asset inequalities, the 
vast majority of the population living in urban areas, strong trade unions, and high dependence on 
the export of commodities) was widely debated. The jump in oil prices in the 1970s caused by 
Organization of Petroleum Countries (OPEC) also resulted in stagflation and, again, was subject to 
considerable analysis (see, for instance, Barsky & Kilian, 2002; Blinder, 1981; Brunner, 
Cukierman, & Meltzer, 1980; Bruno & Sachs, 1979). 
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Aggregate demand and aggregate supply as shown above will 
result in output Q and price level P. As the supply shock pushes the 
supply curve upward, output declines to Q* and the price level increases 
to P*, with the extent of this price increase and output contraction 
depending on the intensity and magnitude of the supply shock. 
If the resulting price increase is large, the monetary authorities can 
deflate the economy by tightening money supply and raising interest rates, 
thus pushing the aggregate demand downward. This could bring prices 
down but further accentuate the fall in output and deepen the recession. 
If the government was to, however, counter the recession 
resulting from the upward shift in the supply curve by increasing 
aggregate demand, say, through a fiscal stimulus, then depending on 
peculiar economic conditions in the economy, this could result in much 
higher inflation without stimulating a corresponding increase in output. 
This would then result in a classical stagflation situation. The point to 
grasp is that, faced with an upward shift in the supply curve, 
policymakers face hard choices. 
4. Pakistan’s Attempt at Stabilization 
That Pakistan had to stabilize its economy in early 2008, given its 
precarious and fast deteriorating macroeconomic situation, was never in 
Aggregate supply 
Aggregate supply 
Aggregate demand 
P* 
P 
Q* Q 
Price  
level 
National product 
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doubt.3 Although the IMF Stand-By Agreement (SBA) was signed in 
November 2008, a “shadow” IMF program had been agreed on earlier 
and was the basis on which the 2008/09 national budget was announced 
in June 2008. 
The key elements of the 23-month SBA for special drawing rights 
(SDR) of USD7.3 billion in support of the macroeconomic stabilization 
program included the following (IMF, 2008): 
• Under the fiscal program, it sought to reduce the deficit from 7.4 
percent of GDP in 2007/08 to 4.2 percent in 2008/09 and 3.3 percent in 
2009/11, while allowing for increased spending on a social safety net 
(through the Benazir Income Support Program [BISP]). This reduction 
was to be achieved by phasing out energy subsidies, reducing 
development expenditures, and raising tax revenues including through 
the introduction of a VAT and other tax and administration reforms. 
• Monetary policy was to be tightened by raising interest rates from 13 
to 15 percent. 
• While not made explicit, the exchange rate was also to be suitably 
depreciated to ensure lost competitiveness over the last few years and 
compress imports. 
Table 2: Movement of Key Economic Variables 
Variable FY 
2004 
FY 
2005 
FY 
2006 
FY 
2007 
FY 
2008 
FY 
2009 
FY 
2010 
FY 
2011 
Economic 
growth 
7.5 9.0 5.8 6.8 3.7 1.7 3.8 2.4 
Fiscal deficit (% 
of GDP) 
-2.4 -3.3 -4.3 -4.3 -7.6 -5.3 -6.3 -5.6* 
Average annual 
inflation rate 
4.6 9.3 7.9 7.8 12.0 20.8 11.7 14.1 
Current account 
balance (% of 
GDP) 
1.3 -1.6 -4.4 -5.1 -8.7 -5.7 -2.2 0.4 
FY = fiscal year, GDP = gross domestic product. 
* Latest estimates. 
Source: Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Economic Survey 2010–11. 
                                                 
3 This was also the main conclusion of the Panel of Economists set up by the Planning Commission 
in September 2008 (see Government of Pakistan, 2008). 
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How well has Pakistan fared in its attempts to stabilize and bring 
about the necessary economic reforms?4 The simple answer to the 
question is that it has not and indeed the economy finds itself in the 
worse of both worlds—low economic growth and high double-digit 
inflation (see Table 2). True, the current account is in a small surplus, but 
this is a reflection of low growth and low investment. Also, Pakistan 
benefited in 2010/11 from favorable terms of trade (cotton, rice), which 
resulted in record exports but with a fall in global prices in cotton, this 
may turn out to be a short-term windfall. 
How has this stagflation come about? The answer lies in the lack 
of consistent and, indeed, ineffective policy measures adopted both on 
the aggregate demand and aggregate supply side. On curbing aggregate 
demand as Table 3 and Figure 2 show, the main burden has fallen on 
investment, with both private and public sector investment falling 
drastically (see also Beaconhouse National University, 2011, p. 24). While 
the former reflects economic stagnation, lack of available energy, and a 
loss of business confidence due to the security and law-and-order 
situation, the latter is mainly because the adjustment burden has fallen on 
the Public Sector Development Program (PSDP), a “low-hanging fruit,” as 
the government has been unable to curb its current expenditures. 
Table 3: Domestic Absorption of Resources (1999–2000 Prices)  
(PKR billion) 
Resource 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 
Consumption  
Of which (private) 
4,297 
(3,708) 
4,415 
(3,883) 
4,518 
(3,779) 
4,746 
(4,246) 
4,929 
(4,412) 
5,275 
(4,719) 
Investment (incl. stocks) 924 1,043 1,114 965 916 915 
GCFG  
Of which (public) 
841 
(200) 
955 
(262) 
1,025 
(275) 
873 
(236) 
820 
(238) 
817 
(2,29) 
Total 5,221 5,458 5,632 5,711 5,845 6,190 
GFCF = gross fixed capital formation. 
* Public investment based on Annual Plans (different issues). This is given in current 
prices and has been deflated using the implicit investment price deflator in the GFCF 
series above. 
Source: Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Economic Survey 2010–11. 
                                                 
4 Initially, the IMF found that progress under the SBA was satisfactory and—given Pakistan’s 
peculiar circumstances—relaxed some of the conditionalities for the short run in view of the global 
recession and Pakistan’s fight against insurgents. The agreement was augmented in August 2009 to 
SDR of USD10.66 billion and extended through December 30, 2010. However, lack of progress 
with economic reforms has led to an impasse in the first half of 2011 with the transfer of the next 
tranche put on hold. 
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Figure 2: Private Investment and Consumption 
 
GDP = gross domestic product. 
Source: Government of Pakistan. (n.d.). Pakistan Economic Survey (Various issues). Islamabad. 
While in constant 1999–2000 prices both private and public 
investment declined by 20 percent between 2007/08 and 2010/11, total 
consumption in the same period increased by 14.3 percent and private 
consumption by 20 percent. The latter has clearly been driven to quite some 
extent by the steep increase in workers’ remittances from abroad, which 
rose from USD6.5 billion in 2007/08 to an estimated USD11 billion in 
2010/11. The increase in remittances is attributed to a shift in transmitting 
money from informal to formal channels as well as to the floods in summer 
2010. However, this area needs further investigation.  
The other injection in demand was the increase in government 
procurement prices for wheat, the staple food, from PKR450/40 kg to 
PKR625/40 kg in April 2008 and further to PKR950/40 kg in October 2008. 
The unprecedented increase in prices is believed to have significantly 
boosted aggregate demand in 2008/09, and has been seen as a major factor 
in further fuelling inflation, which touched over 20 percent in 2008/09. 
Another boost to demand has been the increase in salaries of a 
hefty 50 percent by the federal government in the 2010/11 budget and a 
further 15 percent in the recent 2011/12 budget. These salary increases 
have to be followed not only by the semi-autonomous federal bodies but 
also by the provincial government and local bodies. At the same time, the 
government has not been able to fully remove fuel subsidies despite some 
increases in price, leading to a continuing high circular debt that has 
made worse the energy shortages faced by the economy (Box 1). 
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Box 1: Circular Debt 
The problem of circular debt has plagued the energy sector for more than three 
years, resulting in below-capacity power generation and consequent load-
shedding. The nonpayment of electricity bills by federal and provincial 
government departments lies at the heart of the problem. Unable to recover their 
bills from the government departments, the power distribution companies fail to 
pay the power generation companies who, in turn, default on their payments to 
their major supplier, the Pakistan State Oil Company (PSO), with the oil 
refineries next in line. The delay in the payment of subsidy by the government—
which the distribution companies pass on to consumers—only makes the 
situation worse. Anecdotal evidence puts the size of the circular debt at about 
PKR350 billion. To address the problem of circular debt, the default by 
government departments on their electricity dues—the root cause of the 
problem—must stop immediately. This can be done by allocating a separate 
amount in the budget with which to pay electricity dues to the stakeholders 
concerned. Furthermore, the electricity distribution companies must be 
empowered to discontinue supply to defaulters regardless of their status. 
Resolving the problem of circular debt could mitigate the energy crisis to a 
significant extent, as experts reckon that it could bring 2,000–2,500 MW into the 
power system within a relatively short period. 
Source: Amjad, Din, and Khawaja (2011). 
5. Ineffectiveness of Monetary Policy 
Why has inflation persisted despite a tight monetary policy stance 
by the SBP? We argue that a combination of factors have contributed to 
the ineffectiveness of monetary policy in curbing the rate of inflation. 
First, inflationary expectations remain entrenched due to supply 
disruptions caused by catastrophic floods, increase in electricity prices, 
and the government’s continued reliance on borrowings from the SBP. 
Second, studies have shown that the interest rate channel of monetary 
policy transmission is weak in Pakistan. Since 2005, monetary policy has 
relied mainly on the interest rate channel. It is well known that monetary 
policy actions transmit their effects on macroeconomic variables with a 
considerable lag and with a high degree of volatility and uncertainty. The 
current monetary policy stance is silent on the issues of lags and the pass-
through effect of the policy rate to inflation. There is evidence based on 
empirical analysis that the interest rate influences the rate of inflation 
with a lag of 12 to 18 months, and the magnitude of this impact is very 
small (Khan & Qayyum, 2007; Qayyum, Khan, & Khawaja, 2007). Indeed, 
some studies show that the relationship between the interest rate and rate 
of inflation is positive (Khan, 2007).  
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Interest rate and inflation movements for the period 2007–10 is 
presented in Figure 3. It suggests a positive relationship between the 
interest rate and inflation, although clearly a number of other factors were 
at play. The coefficient of correlation is 0.688. It implies that the rising 
interest rate in recent years has had little impact on dampening inflation 
and there is no reason to believe that the situation has now changed.  
Figure 3: Movements of Inflation and Interest Rate 
 
Source: Government of Pakistan. (n.d.). Pakistan Economic Survey (Various issues). Islamabad. 
Third, the lack of coordination between fiscal and monetary 
policies has made monetary policy largely ineffective in controlling the 
rate of inflation. The government is borrowing beyond the agreed level 
from the SBP, and the SBP is not able to restrain this level of borrowing. 
The likelihood then is that the government would finance the higher 
deficit on account of higher interest payments by borrowing further from 
the central bank. Borrowing from the SBP injects liquidity into the system 
through increased currency in circulation. The impact therefore of a tight 
monetary policy stance is diluted with this automatic creation of money, 
which increases the money supply. International experience has shown 
that monetary expansion can be an important source of stagflation. For 
example, the excessive expansion of money is generally believed to be the 
main cause of the stagflationary episode of 1973–75 in the US. A similar 
monetary expansion preceded the second stagflationary episode of 1982 
(Blinder, 1979). Sargent (1988) argues that monetary policy is less effective 
than is generally believed mainly because the size of the portfolio of 
government debts is beyond the control of the monetary authorities. The 
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study predicts that “under a deficit spending policy it is impossible to run 
a noninflationary monetary policy” (p. 321).  
It is generally expected that an increase in the interest rate would 
act as a deterrent to increased government borrowings from the central 
bank. In fact, it could further worsen the situation. The increase in the 
interest rate would increase interest payments on government debt, 
leading to an even higher fiscal deficit even if we take into account the 
higher profits of the SBP. During 2008/09, the increase in the discount rate 
increased the cost of borrowing from the treasury bills, Pakistan 
investment bonds, and national savings schemes. During the same period, 
an amount of PKR580 billion was spent on servicing domestic debt against 
the budgeted estimates of PKR459.1 billion. The fact is that easy recourse to 
increased borrowings from the SBP leaves little incentive for the 
government to put its fiscal house in order. In this situation, an increase in 
the interest rate can further worsen rather than improve the situation. 
If the increase in the interest rate neither helps to reduce inflation 
nor appears to deter government borrowing, then the real hit is taken by 
the private sector. Higher interest rates increase the cost of borrowing for 
the private sector, which discourages the demand for private sector credit, 
thus stifling private investment and economic growth. There is a strong 
negative correlation between the discount rate and credit to the private 
sector (-0.84 over the period August 2009 to August 2010). When the 
monetary authority reduced the policy rate by 100 basis points from 14 to 
13 percent in August 2009 and then further to 12.5 percent in November 
2009, credit to the private sector increased gradually during this period. In 
August 2010, the monetary authority again tightened monetary policy by 
increasing the policy rate by 50 basis points from 12.5 to 13 percent, which 
has again negatively affected credit to the private sector (see Figure 4). 
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Figure 4: Interest Rate and Credit to Private Sector 
 
Source: Government of Pakistan. (n.d.). Pakistan Economic Survey (Various issues). Islamabad. 
6. Breaking Out of Stagflation5 
Breaking out of stagflation requires a coherent approach to 
stabilize the macroeconomy and address the binding constraints to the 
supply side to boost output on a sustained basis. To achieve these 
objectives, we suggest a four-point approach. 
i. Better Macroeconomic Management 
Prudent macroeconomic management is essential to pull the 
economy out of the current malaise. First, there is an urgent need to curb 
the monetization of fiscal deficit, which has contributed to inflationary 
pressures in the economy. Such a move would provide the necessary 
space for monetary policy to adjust so as to facilitate private credit 
without compromising price stability. Second, better policy coordination 
between the center and the provinces, especially after the 18th 
Constitutional Amendment and the 7th National Finance Commission 
award, is essential to maintain macroeconomic stability.  
Third, sectoral economic decisions (e.g., food prices) must be 
weighed carefully, keeping in view their impact on key macroeconomic 
variables. Past experience has shown that arbitrary decisions on key food 
prices helped stoke inflationary pressures in the economy that still show 
                                                 
5 This section draws heavily on Amjad, Din, and Khawaja (2011). 
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no signs of abating.6 Finally, a more effective utilization of foreign loans 
with a particular focus on channeling resources to addressing binding 
supply constraints, including energy shortages, would help revive the 
commodity producing sectors. There is room for better coordination 
between the Economic Affairs Division and the Planning Commission to 
ensure that the foreign resource envelope is utilized in line with the 
country’s development priorities. 
ii. Achieving Fiscal Discipline while Reviving the Government’s Role 
in Development 
Fiscal profligacy has been a root cause of macroeconomic 
imbalances. We argue that, whereas maintaining fiscal prudence is 
absolutely essential, it is also necessary to revive the government’s role in 
the development process. To achieve fiscal discipline, concerted efforts 
are needed both to rationalize public spending and to reform the taxation 
system. In particular, all but targeted subsidies must be eliminated, the 
PSDP must be reprioritized to concentrate resources on development 
projects that are critical for the country’s competitiveness, and the 
massive losses of state-owned enterprises must be plugged to free up 
resources to finance the country’s development needs. These measures 
need to be complemented by a freeze on nondevelopment spending that 
would encourage the public sector to adopt austerity measures, thus 
allowing more space for development spending.  
On the revenue generation front, the need to generate more 
revenues cannot be overemphasized, given the abysmally low tax-to-GDP 
ratio. The imposition of RGST has been stalled due to lack of political 
will. We believe that introducing RGST is essential to fully tap the 
revenue generation capacity as well as to help the process of 
documentation in the economy. To widen the tax base, all sources of 
income—including agriculture, services, and real estate—must be 
brought under the tax net. In addition, there is significant potential for 
generating tax revenues at the provincial level, given that the 
contribution of the provinces to total tax revenues is just around 10 
percent. The provinces could be encouraged to generate more tax 
revenues if the transfer of funds to the provinces under the 7th National 
Finance Commission award was linked to the provinces’ taxation efforts 
while taking into account the revenue generation capacity of each.  
                                                 
6 An example is the massive increase in the wheat procurement price from PKR450/40 kg in 2007 
to PKR950/40 kg. 
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It must be emphasized here that the restoration of fiscal balance must 
not come at the cost of critical development spending by the public sector. 
Unfortunately, the current fiscal squeeze meant to contain the fiscal deficit 
has largely been borne by the PSDP while nondevelopment expenditures 
have not seen any significant reductions. Cuts in development spending, 
including on critical physical infrastructure, will have adverse implications 
for the country’s long-term competitiveness. What is needed here is a 
strategy to rationalize public spending to avoid across-the-board cuts in 
development expenditures, and to ensure that scarce development funds are 
channeled into key sectors such as energy and more labor-intensive activities 
to help promote job creation and boost economic growth. Furthermore, 
public spending on physical infrastructure would not only strengthen the 
country’s long-term competitiveness, it would also help in poverty 
alleviation, as research has shown that spending on infrastructure is the most 
pro-poor public expenditure (see Arif & Iqbal, 2009). 
iii. Prudent Monetary Management to Spur the Private Sector 
The current monetary policy has not been helpful in either ensuring 
macroeconomic stability or reviving growth in the economy. There are 
some encouraging signs that point out that there is some scope for 
monetary policy to adjust toward helping the revival of the private sector. 
First, the government is reining in its borrowings from the SBP. This move 
should enable the central bank to contain monetary expansion within the 
desired limits, thus providing the necessary space for monetary policy to 
be more accommodating toward shoring up economic activity. Second, the 
exchange rate remains stable and is underpinned by favorable external 
account indicators, including a surge in remittances, a pickup in exports, 
and a healthy foreign exchange reserves position. Third, according to the 
Pakistan Institute of Development Economics’ latest business barometer 
survey (April 2011), there are distinct signs of “green shoots” in the 
economy. The survey reported a modest increase in business volumes by 
almost half the respondents during the second half of 2010, and firms were 
optimistic about growth in their business volumes in the future.  
Recent data shows that growth in the large-scale manufacturing 
sector, though sluggish, remains positive. There is ample unutilized capacity 
and growth could quickly accelerate with a significant boost coming from an 
improvement in rural incomes triggered by an increase in commodity prices. 
The above factors point out that the private sector is expected to respond 
positively to an appropriate adjustment of monetary policy, and that the 
latter move is not likely to imperil price or exchange rate stability.  
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iv. Social Safety Nets 
The combination of persistently high inflation and low growth is a 
recipe for declining purchasing power, joblessness, and poverty. In this 
scenario, well-designed social safety nets could ease the pain of adjustment 
for poor households during the time the economy takes to revert to robust 
growth with price stability. Whereas the BISP has proved an effective tool 
in poverty alleviation, its coverage remains limited. We believe that some 
fiscal space could be created to widen the scope of income transfers under 
the BISP by cutting waste in nondevelopment spending and by minimizing 
the losses of public sector enterprises. In addition, more effective and 
judicious utilization of zakat funds would be instrumental in providing the 
necessary support to the poor and vulnerable groups.  
7. Concluding Remarks 
This article has identified the factors underlying the current 
episode of stagflation, and has spelled out a set of policy measures to pull 
the economy out of this quagmire. We have argued that, while the 
economy remains beset by structural weaknesses and lack of political 
resolve to undertake critical economic reforms, the major cause of the 
current stagflation can be traced to supply shocks that have resulted in 
output contraction with a concomitant increase in the price level. Buoyant 
demand on the back of high fiscal deficits, strong growth in remittances, 
high support prices for cereals, and a significant increase in public sector 
wages has only added to the inflationary pressures. Furthermore, 
macroeconomic stabilization policies have been unsuccessful in curbing 
the rate of inflation, due mainly to the lack of coordination between 
monetary and fiscal policies.  
We have stressed that, whereas achieving macroeconomic stability 
is essential, it is equally important to address the binding supply-side 
constraints, including the crippling energy shortages. With this in view, 
we have outlined a four-point strategy that emphasizes better 
macroeconomic management, achieving fiscal discipline while reviving 
the role of the government in the development process, prudent 
monetary management to spur private activity, and social safety nets. 
Pakistan’s economy has shown resilience in the past and it is hoped that, 
with the right policies in place, economic growth can be revived on a 
sustained basis in an environment of macroeconomic stability. 
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